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The Lag From Money To Prices
KEITH M. CAELSON
CONOMISTS generally agree that money affects
prices with a lag. Research conducted at this Bank
suggests that a change in the growth rate of money
is fully reflected in the inflation rate in about five
years. This conclusion was based on a statistical anal-
ysis of the relation between money and prices in the
U.S. from 1955 through the 19605,1
The length of the lag between money and prices
represents important information that must be con-
sidered in the policy formulation process. The policy-
maker must allow for such lags when developing a
policy to control inflation; he must also consider pos-
sible future impacts of short-run policies designed to
combat recession. Given the historical presence of
lags between money and prices, a policy designed to
control inflation will not have immediate effects. The
possible short-mn costs (benefits) of a restrictive
(stimulative) policy in terms of employment and
output must be assessed against its long-run benefits
(costs) in terms of the price level. The nature of the
lag enters importantly into the decision to adopt a
specific policy, whether it be short- or long-mn in
character.
The purpose of this article is to examine the rela-
tion between money and prices in light of the U.S.
tDenis S. Karnosky, “The Link Between Money and Prices,”
this Review (June 1976), pp. 17-23. Also see Albert E. Burger,
“Is Inflation All Due to Money?” this Review (December
1978), pp. 8-12.
economic experience of the 1970s. Statistical results
are summarized first and the economics of informa-
tion and search are then summarized to provide a
theoretical rationale for the results.
Statistical Results
Karnosky’s original estimate of the price equation
was based on the sample period from 1955 through
mid-1971 and used what is now known as “old Ml”
for the money variable. A version of this equation,
estimated by using the “new” M1B definition of
money, is summarized in table 1.2 Compared to the
original results, using a different definition of money
and modifying the sample period affects the pattern
of the coefficients very little. The sum of the coeffi-
cients is one, as would be expected from economic
theory.3 The mean lag is estimated at 10.96 quarters
for the 1955-69 sample period.4
2
1n this article, money is defined as M1B (currency plus check-
able deposits at financial institutions). SeeR. W. Ruler, “The
New Monetary Aggregates,” this Review (February 1980),
pp. 25-32. The sample period differs slightly from Kamosky’s..
for purposes of balancing degrees of freedom, so that the
1970s can be compared with the “pre-197Os”.
3
For a discussion of the theory, see Leonall C. Andersen and
Denis S. Kamosky, “The Appropriate Time Frame for Con-
trolling Monetary Aggregates The St. Louis Evidence,” in
Controlling Monetary Aggregates II: The Implementation,
Conference Series No. 9, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston
(September 1972), pp. 147-77.
~The mean lag serves as a summary measure of the speed with
which prices respond to money, It is calculated as a sum of
products (where each product is the coefficient times the num-
ber of the lag) divided by the sum of the coefficients.
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To examine the nature of the money -price lag in significant role in explaining inflation during the 1955
light of the experience of the 1970s it is necessary 69 period.5
to considei other factors that influenced the price
level during this pcriod. From August 1971 to Apiil The results for 1970-79 indicate a number of
1974 a government program of wage and puce con- ch nge relauve to those for l95~ 69. The price con-
trol disrupted the money -puce level link. In addi- tiol dumm is significant with a negative sign and
lion in lat’ 1973 and eaily 1974 substantial increases the post-control dunimv has th expected (positive)
in energy prices occurred. At various times during sign but is not significant. The sum effect of eneigy
the lO7Os agricultural conditions also appeared to prices, as measured by the producer price of fuels
affect movements in the price level or moie properly and related products and power is positive and signifi-
in the indexes that arc used to measuie changes in cant. The food price vanable has the expected sign
aggregate prices. and is just short of being significant. More impor-
tautly however the pattern of coefficients on money
is substantiall different fiom that estimated for 19j5-
69. No cocificients are significant after the eighth Fig
and the mean lag is 5.05 qua ter . The sum of the
coefficients although close to one in value is not
significantl different from zero.
These results suggest th’st the 20 quartei lag struc-
tttre is no longer appiopriate for data from the 1970s.
~Throughout thi article, “stati tical significa cc” r f n. to a
vo tailed te t conductid at the 5 perc i t level. For large
samples, the cri ical “t” is —1.96.
Because of these factors, the basic price equation
in this article has been respecified to include prices
of food and energy relative to overall prices and
dummy variables to capture nonmonetary effects of
wage arid price controls. Table 2 summarizes the re-
sults for the 1970-79 period (center columns) and,
for comparison purposes, also summarizes the results
of this same specification for the 1955-69 period (left-
hand column). As implied in Karnosky”s specification,
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Chart I
Cumulative Effect on Rate of Price Increase of
a Permanent Increase in the Rate of Growth of Money
Percent of Total Effect
The results of shortening the lag struethre to 12 quar-
ters (with the thirteenth constrained to equal zero)
are shown in the right-hand columns of table 2. With
this specification, the effect of money on prices equals
slightly more than one after 12 quarters. The mean
lag for the specification is 5.91 quarters, which is
significantly different from the 10.54-quarter mean lag
obtained for the 1955-69 period.
Chart 1 portrays the results from the 1eft~and
right~hand columns of table 2 and indicates that
prices apparently responded more rapidly to changes
in money during the 1970s than previously. Why did
this happen and what does it imply in terms of for-
mulating a policy to combat inflation?
Theoretical Rationale for Lags
Questions about the lag between prices and money
can be analyzed within the framework of information
and search theory.6 To facilitate an understanding of
lags and of the reasons they change, this article de-
velops a theory of lag determination.?
6
Most of the literature on information and search theory is in
the context of labor markets, For a survey, see Steven A.
Lippman and John 3. McCall, “The Eeonoinics of Job
Search: A Survey,” Economic Inquiry (June and September
1976), pp. 155-89, 347-68, For a discussion of the money-
price lag within the context of rational expectations, see
Bennett T. MeCallum, “Price Level Adjustments and the
Rational Expectations Approach to Macroeconomic Stabiliza-
Consider a typical firm that is a price-setter in an
economic environment in which illformation regard-
ing equilibrium prices and quantities is costly to ob-
tain on both sides of the market8 Firms do not pos-
sess full information about the prices or the quality
of their competitors’ products. Similarly, customers
do not possess full information about the prices that
all sellers are charging. Firms must determine whether
a change in demand for their prodi.iets is caused by a
switch in consumer preferences or by a general shift
in aggregate demand. Moreover, they have to decide
whether such a shift is permanent or temporary.
For purposes of illustration, assume that the typical
firm obtains information about the demand for its
product by observing its sales at the current ‘<posted”
price. Given the fact that the firm possesses accumu-
lated information on quantities sold at a given price
and assuming that the firm knows its own cost struc-
hire, it will eventually learn which price is optimal
for its operations.
Hon Policy,” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking (Novem-
ber 1978), pp. 418-36.
~AIthough the economics of information and search is not neces-
sarily a theory of lag determination, this is a common implica-
tion of the analysis, as it is usually applied.
SThe classic article which develops this point is Kenneth J.
Arrow, “Toward a Theory of Price Adjustment,” in Moses
Abramovitz, ed., The Allocation of Fco,wmic Resources (Stan-
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Figure












Figure 1 summarizes the situation for a typical
finn. If costs and demand are known perfectly, Po and
Qo represent the profit-maximizing price and quantity.
More realistically, perhaps, the demand curve can he
viewed as the average rate of sales for given prices
based on experience, with some “normally expected”
variation around this average. For the sake of exposi-.
lion, this demand curve is shown in the top half of fig-
ure 1 as a band rather than a line, with the additional
assumption being made that quantity sold at a par-
ticular price is distributed normally about the mean.
The bottom half of figure 1 summarizes the nature
of this demand curve in terms of a probability distri-
bution. The solid line in the bottom half of fig~ire 1
is a subjectively determined distribution that is based
on sales experience, as well as other informational
factors, when the price of the product is equal to Po.
Each additional observation of quantity sold at Po
will affect the firm’s assessment of the nature of the
distribution it faces. Suppose that, in a pathciilar pe-
Hod, the firm realizes sales of Q~ at price Po; will it
change its price? if demand shifts so that Q~ is the
mean of the new distribution, the profit-maximizing
price would be P1 (and the distribution as drawn
with respect toP2 will be slightly to the right of Q~).9
However, the firm will not change it8 price to P1
unless its subjective assessment of the distribution
has shifted accordingly; that is, the firm will change
its price to P1 only if the solid line shifts to coincide
with the Q, distribution (drawn with respect to P0).
In the absence of other information, it is reasonable
to assume that the firm’s subjective distribution will
shift only slightly with a single observation, depending
on past experience. Continued sales around Qi for a
number of periods, however, would eventually shift
the subjective distribution so that it would be cen-
tered over Qi. Furthermore, the speed with which
the firm will move to P1 depeilds on the nature of
the distribution around Q~.If sales are distributed
narrowly around Q~,the firm will have greater confi-
deuce in the new distribution than if sales are dis-
tributed broadly. Over an extended period of time,
the magnitude of price response will be the same
but the speed of response will vary
Even with a new subjective distribution, the firm
will not immediately change its price. The fact that
the process of adjusting price is costly will influence
the firm’s decision to change price. Changing price
tags, making up new price lists, notifying salesmen,
and/or reprogramming computers all involve costs.
In addition, because firms do not know precisely what
their competitors will do, a premature decision to in-
crease price could result in a loss of customers. There
is also a possible loss of customer goodwill if a firm
changes price frequently, thereby shifting additional
search costs to consumers. The change in sales must
be both sufficiently large and perceived as relatively
permanent before the firm will adjust its price.
The Money-Price Lag in an
Aggregate Context
In a growing economy, firms will experience in-
creasing sales over time and/or the number of firms
will change. However, expansion of quantities sold
need not imply rising prices. Prices will rise oniy if
aggregate demand is shifting outward more rapidly
9
Note that nominal resource eosts are assumed to be unchanged.
In a general inflation, resource costs will also rise. The focus
here is on the Rim’s response to a shift in aggregate demand.
Recognition of such a shift before resource costs increase
represents exploitable profit opportunities for the firm.
Ma inat
Cost A~e~ag’
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than aggregate supply (which can be interpreted as
a “suitable” aggregation of individual firms’ marginal
cost curves). If the position of the demand curve is
dominated by movements in the stock of money,
firms’ assessments of demand will depend on their
expectations of monetary growth,1~~
This reinterpretation of the money-price lag in an
aggregate context can be illustrated in terms of figure
1. Qo represents an average level of sales for a given
planning period and is associated with a given rate
of monetary growth. The price will equal P0 if this
expected monetary growth is realized.” However, if
the rate of monetary growth is higher than expected,
sales averaging Qi (at price P0) could be consistently
realized. Firms will have to determine whether this
change in monetary growth is permanent or tempo~
rary. Ultimately, firms must decide whether a price
change is necessary. As explained earlier, a change
in monetary growth will not necessarily lead to an
immediate pricing response by firms. Profit-maximiz-
ing considerations will still determine whether the
decision to change price should be made immediately
or postponed until further information is obtained.
Reinterpretation of the analysis demonstrates how
additional information influences the pricing process.
Firms derive information about the state of demand
by observing their sales. In an aggregate context,
however, some connection between monetary growth
and firms’ sales will also apply. For example, if firms
have observed a close relation between sales and
monetary growth, their subjective distributions might
shift significantly in anticipation of a change in mone-
tary growth. In other words, firms’ prices might be
changed in anticipation of an increase in sales.12 In-
formation about changes in monetary growth will
reduce the lagged impact of money on prices. The
whole process of determining price changes involves
both sides of the market. If firms’ customers have
similar perceptions about monetary growth, they will
expect prices to change, and firms’ loss of customer
goodwill, as a result of changing prices sooner, will be
reduced.
10
See Leoi~allC. Andersen and Jerry L. Jordan, ‘Monetary and
Fiscal Actions A Test of Their Relative Importance in
Economic Stabilization,” this Review (November 1968), pp.
11-24.
llDjfferent rates of expected monetary growth will, of course,
imply different P
0
s, but costs will also be different so that
Qo need not differ. The emphasis here, however, is on the
decision to change price.
12
See Charles Pigott, “Expectations, Money, and the Forecast-
ing of Inflation,” Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
Economic Review (Spring 1980), pp. 30-49.
A Suggested Explanation of the
Statistical Results
The analysis suggests that wheii sales deviate from
expected levels, price changes will eventually result.
The length of the time interval between sales devia-
tions and price changes will depend on the firm’s per-
ception that demand has shifted. This perception
is conditioned by (1) the past history of inflation
and monetary growth and (2) the distribution of re-
cently observed deviations.
First, as shown by the results summarized in table
2, firms and their customers have developed a greater
sensitivity to inflation and monetary growth during
the 1970s. During the 1955-69 period, the response
of prices to money was quite slow because the early
part of the period was dominated by relatively slow
inflation. As a result, during the latter part of the
period, there was a tendency to consider higher rates
of inflation and monetary growth as temporaiy.13
During the 1970s, however, economic units began
placing more emphasis on recent experience when
forming their expectations; they learned from their
past errors.
Second, during the 1970s, the nature of the distHbu~
tion of deviations of money growth from what was
expected (and, consequently, deviations of sales from
what was expected) appears to have changed con-
siderably. Some summary statistics are presented in
table 3. Quartemto-quarter rates of change are ex-
amined for 20- and 12-quarter periods during the full
1955-79 period. These measures are examined to de-
termineif the pattern of monetary growth has changed
from the pattern observed for 1955-69.
The summary statistics that appear at the bottom
of table 3 indicate that the results are mixed. The
mean standard deviation, for example, changed little
between the 1955-69 and the 1970-79 periods. How-
ever, the standard deviation of the means dropped
sharply in the latter period, suggesting that the vari-
ation in monetary growth became more regular in
the 1970s. This movement toward regularity suggests
— although it does not necessarily imply — greater
predictability. Nonetheless, tentalive evidence appears
to support the noUou that monetary growth became
more predictable in the 197Os.’~
l3This has been labeled the “return-to-iiorrnahty” hypothesis
For discussion and statistical results, see David H. Resler,
“The Foimation of Inflation Expectations,” this fleview
(April 1980), pp. 2-12.
t4
Tlie pattern of motietary growth would have to be examined
more thoroughly, and probably in conjunction with a fonnal
8OCTOBER 1990
Table 3





End of Standard Standard
period Mean deviation Mean deviation
IV/55 3.14 1.86 2.23 1.54
JV!56 2.56 1.95 1.88 1.50
i’//57 1.54 1.66 1.31 1.78
IVi5a 1.74 1.9? 1.33 2.09
JV59 1.85 2.36 1.74 2.77
IV1SO 1.34 2.45 1.68 3.01
IV,61 1.71 2.47 2.06 2.59
JV162 1.92 2.47 1.34 2.20
1W63 2.38 2.24 2.65 1.45
IV/64 2.42 2.34 3.43 1.65
IV’65 3.31 1.81 4.11 1.55
rV/66 .3.49 2.17 3.86 2.47
IV/67 4.28 2.38 4.55 2.87
Ivies 5.01 2.66 5.65 3.06
V/fig 4.95 2.79 5.48 2.77
IV/7O 5.15 2.71 5.42 2.15
IV,71 5.59 2.51 5.38 2.52
IV/72 6.25 2.38 6.37 2.45
IV/?3 6.05 2.45 6.92 2.15
V/74 5.94 2.24 6.07 2.31
IV/75 6.12 2.24 5.50 2.18
IV/76 5.85 2.12 5.18 111
IV/77 6.09 2.14 6.25 2.05
tv/iS 8.31 2.09 7.11 1.92
6.89 2.20 7.97 1.80
Mean ‘1955.69) 2.78 2.24 2.89 2.22
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await further research. See, however Robert J. Barro,
“Unantieipated Money, Output, and the Price Level in the
United States,’ Journal oJ Political Economy (August 1978),
pp. 549-80.
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Implications of the Analysis
The lag in the effect of money on prices appears
to have shortened during the 1970s, but the reasons
for this contraction are unclear. One interpretation is
that recent experience now receives more weight in
the formation of expectations. Snch a situation would
be beneficial for the policymaker, because it indicates
that there is less inertia to be overcome in designing
a policy to reduce inflation, On the other hand, a
policy of short-run economic stimulus can give rise to
a burst of inflation expectations, with little realized
positive effect on output.
A second interpretation of the shortened lag be-
tween money and prices is that it occurred because of
the pattern of monetary growth. Although conclusions
about the nature of the distribution of realized mone-
tary growth are not definite, this interpretation implies
that a steady reduction in monetary growth will re-
sult in less output loss than an erratic reduction. If
both expected arid actual monetary growth can be
reduced simultaneously, the effect on output need
not be severe or pro1onged.1~
‘
5
Past relationships based on an environment of uncertainty
and continuing deviation of expected and realized monetary
growth are misleading in assessing the costs of redueit~g
inflation. See Laurence H. Meyer and Robert H. Rasehe, “On
the Costs and Benefits of Anti-Inflation Policies,” this Review
(February 1980), pp. 3-14.
10